CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

CIIPS WORKING PAPER #12

MANAGING REGIONAL CONFLICT:

REGIMES AND THIRD-PARTY MEDIATORS

Proceedings of a Workshop held
in Ottawa 6-7 May 1988

By Kenneth Bush and Richard Price

INSTITUT CANADIEN POUR LA PAIX ET
LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES

307 Gilmour Ottawa Canada K2P 0P7 • (613) 990-1593

89-00065/

CIIPS WORKING PAPER #12

MANAGING REGIONAL CONFLICT:

REGIMES AND THIRD-PARTY MEDIATORS

Proceedings of a Workshop held
in Ottawa 6-7 May 1988

By Kenneth Bush and Richard Price

ISBN #: 0-662-16516-0

PREFACE

CIIPS Working Papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publication, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers--mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published in the original language only.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

Kenneth Bush is a Research Assistant at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and an M.A. student in Conflict Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

Richard Price is also an M.A. student in Conflict Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

CONDENSÉ

L'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales et la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Université Carleton, à Ottawa) ont tenu dans la capitale nationale, les 6 et 7 mai 1988, un atelier intitulé La gestion des conflits régionaux : régimes et tierces parties médiatrices. Cela faisait suite à un atelier qui avait eu lieu en novembre 1987. Se basant sur les études de cas présentées en novembre, les participants ont examiné les dimensions théoriques de l'intervention de tierces parties. L'atelier visait principalement à definir la gamme des formules susceptibles de favoriser la gestion et le règlement des conflits régionaux. Les participants ont ainsi dû examiner l'intervention de tierces parties dans son sens le plus large, la médiation ne constituant dès lors qu'une voie possible; parmi les autres formules mentionnées pendant la discussion, citons les opérations de maintien de la paix, la surveillance pour garantir le respect des accords, les sanctions, et l'accroissement de l'aide économique. Les conflits régionaux qui ont retenu l'attention sont ceux qui sévissent en Afrique australe, en Asie du Sud, dans le golfe Persique et en Amérique centrale.

Le point de référence conceptuel qui a servi d'axe aux présentations et à la discussion a été la notion de "régime de sécurité" défini par Robert Jervis (1982) comme étant "les principes, les règles et les normes en vertu desquels des pays feront preuve de modération dans leur comportement, dans l'espoir que les autres leur emboîteront le pas". Cette orientation conceptuelle repose sur quatre questions-cadres :

i. Les régimes de sécurité existent-ils dans un cadre régional, et le cas échéant, quelles en sont les caractéristiques ?

ii. Si les régimes de sécurité existent vraiment, quelles conditions leur création nécessite-t-elle et peut-on généraliser à cet égard ?

iii. S'ils existent, quelle est leur véritable contribution à la gestion et au règlement des conflits ?

iv. Quel rôle les tierces parties, définies au sens large, peuvent-elles jouer dans l'élaboration d'un régime de sécurité ?

Un certain nombre de thèmes se sont dégagés des délibérations. L'importance de l'hégémonie et de la légitimité dans le contexte de la sécurité régionale a souvent dominé les débats, notamment quand on parlait des conflits en Afrique australe. Les participants se sont également beaucoup intéressés au moment où les tierces parties interviennent. Cependant, on a aussi voulu évaluer l'utilité de la notion de régime de sécurité dans les efforts déployés pour comprendre et apaiser les conflits régionaux, et ce fut là le thème analysé avec le plus de vigueur. Des discussions détaillées ont concerné les fondements normatifs de la tendance des régimes de sécurité à préserver le statu quo; l'utilité analytique de la théorie des régimes par rapport à son utilité descriptive; et la question de savoir si ladite théorie est plus utile quand on analyse les rapports inter-étatiques plutôt qu'intra-étatiques, vu que les parties ont des objectifs différents dans chaque cas.

Les études de cas abordées par les participants étaient fort variées, mais la discussion a révélé un certain nombre de conditions nécessaires à l'élaboration d'un régime régional de sécurité :

i. le désir des parties régionales d'exclure l'intervention des superpuissances ou de déterminer la nature de leur rôle, de façon que le conflit régional conserve toute son intégrité en tant que tel;

ii. l'évolution des conditions économiques (l'amélioration de ces dernières peut favoriser la mise en place d'un régime, mais leur détérioration peut aussi obliger les parties à agir de même);

iii. une langue commune ou un sens commun d'identité culturelle;

iv. une même perception de la menace.

Un participant a signalé à bon droit que les conditions présidant à la création d'un régime de sécurité dépendent du type de régime envisagé; il a cité trois types de régimes qui se distinguent par la mesure où les parties acceptent volontaire- ment les restrictions imposées : ce sont les régimes coercitifs, les régimes spontanés, et les régimes négociés.

Dans l'ensemble, les participants ont conclu que la création d'un régime de sécurité suppose la convergence des attentes au sujet d'un jeu de normes, de règles, de principes et de procédures; or, l'intervention active de tierces parties peut favoriser une telle convergence.

CONTENTS

	Pages
Introduction	1
Theories of Regime and Third-Party Intervention	2
Fen Hampson	2
Brian Mandell	4
Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly	6
Discussion	8
Southern Africa	9
Chris Brown	9
Dan O'Meara	10
Discussion	12
Robert Matthews	16
Discussion	17
Strategies of De-escalation in Regional Conflict	18
Louis Kriesberg	18
Discussion	19
The Role and Effectiveness of Sanctions in South Africa.	20
Douglas Anglin	20
Discussion	23
Arms Transfers and Regime Creation in the Gulf	25
Keith Krause	25
Discussion	27
The Indo-Pakistan Conflict	28
Ashok Kapur	28
Discussion	29
Central America	31
Liisa North	31
Discussion	33
Workshop Conclusion	33
Bibliography	37

Appendices

		Pages
A	Workshop Participants	38
B	Key Concepts Used in the Workshop	40
C	Questions for Discussion	42
D	Typology of Security Regimes	43
E	Toward a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict - Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher	45
F	Managing Regional Conflict in Southern Africa - Chris Brown	58
G	Notes on South Africa - Dan O'Meara	61

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (Carleton University, Ottawa) convened a workshop entitled "Managing Regional Conflict: Regimes and Third-Party Mediation" in Ottawa on May 6-7, 1988. This was a follow-up to the workshop held in November 1987 (the procedings of which are presented by Robert Miller in the CIIPS Working Paper #8). Building on the case studies presented in the November session, the workshop focussed on the theoretical dimensions of third-party mediation, specifically the application of the concept of "security regime" to a variety of regional conflicts.

Paper presentations and discussion were shaped by a series of questions (see Appendix C) sent in advance to workshop participants. The questions were designed to define the parameters of discussion and to serve as the basis for a critical assessment of the analytical utility of the notion of security regime, as developed in the work of Robert Jervis and Joseph Nye (for a review of key concepts, refer to Appendix B).

A number of recurrent themes were evident in paper presentations and discussion. Most prominently: What is the analytical utility of "security regime"? How does the concept help us to understand a conflict and generate useful policy recommendations? Does identification of the elements of a security regime help us in developing effective third-party intervention strategies?

THEORIES OF REGIME AND THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION

Professor Fen Hampson (CIIPS)

Professor Hampson began his presentation by noting that the last workshop had dealt with the question: "what role can third parties play to help bring about an end to military hostilities in regional conflicts in the Third World?". Whereas the last workshop addressed the conditions for successful mediation, the current workshop was explained to be an attempt to "focus on the conditions for bringing about viable regional security regimes in Third World conflicts" and asks the question, "how, over time, [might] third parties help foster levels of cooperation among regional adversaries, reduce tensions, and promote a redefinition of the conflict?" It was stressed that one of the principal aims of the workshop was to consider the range of potential policy responses to regional conflict management, which would require "third-party intervention" to be understood in its broadest sense, with mediation being but one response (other examples cited were peace keeping, monitoring compliance and development and economic assistance). Informal means of intervention were also noted as important considerations. In short, "we should not be limited by a narrow conception of mediation in the present workshop."

The Concept of Regime

The central issue under consideration was the applicability of the notion of regime to regional conflict and issues of conflict management. As a starting point, the commonly accepted definition of international regime was cited: "the formal and informal norms, rules, and principles for regulating behaviour between states in conflict." This notion was further developed by reference to Robert Jervis' definition of

a security regime: "the principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate." The essential point was that security regimes refer to something more than simply short-term self-interest. However, certain short-comings in the literature were argued to require further examination: Who sets the rules in a security regime? What are the characteristics of regimes--where do exploitative "regimes" fit in? What are the situations in which adversarial states may cooperate, especially in the shadow of a hegemon?

The question of the role of hegemony in a regional security relationship was also addressed. "The security relationship among a group of adversaries may well display a degree of 'cooperation' because of the presence of a regional hegemon which has the power to impose its will on smaller states." The relationship between South Africa and the Front Line States was cited as an example of simultaneous military conflict and high levels of economic cooperation. The economic dependence of Front Line States on South Africa was argued to limit their ability to manoeuvre in the realm of both economic and security issues. However, this type of relationship "is hardly the sort... that one wants to see continue or emulated in other regions."

Professor Hampson tentatively suggested a typology of security regimes (refer to matrix in Appendix D). Regimes were argued to be distinguishable by their degree of "institutionalization," i.e., "the degree to which norms, rules and principles are formally set down somewhere and the degree to which there are monitoring agencies and institutions to promote cooperation and deal with verification, enforcement and non-compliance." Also stressed was the importance of being sensitive "to the possibilities for more modest cooperation and "partial" regime building efforts."

Professor Brian Mandell (Carleton University)

Professor Mandell's presentation sought to outline the conceptual considerations of the workshop and stressed the importance of establishing a common terminology. Two of the key concepts to the workshop were identified as "hurting stalemate" and "the ripe moment" (refer to Appendix B for a review of the key concepts). It was hoped that these concepts would be rigorously examined in workshop discussion. Are these concepts generalizable? What is their relevance across different conflicts and contexts? From whose perspective is a moment ripe--the participants' or outside observers'? Whereas the literature has tended to focus on the nature of the issues, the modes of intervention, and the qualities of mediators, it was noted that the timing variable had recently attracted attention, especially in terms of escalation dynamics (see, for example, the workshop presentation by Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald Fisher).

Mandell asked whether there is, in fact, a ripe moment. According to William Zartman, a ripe moment depends on a "hurting stalemate." If this is so, then the crucial question is; how do we know it when we see it? A characteristic that has been associated with "hurting stalemate" is a flare-up in hostilities followed by a "grinding crisis" in which there is no apparent prospect of returning to the status quo ante. Often the conflict at this stage is at too low an intensity to attract third party intervention. An important consideration at this point is how third parties could be motivated to intervene. A conflict moves into a hurting stalemate when it reaches a plateau or deadlock, in which neither side is able to achieve its aims unilaterally, no possibility of escalation or "winning exists, and both sides realize the unacceptable rising costs of being locked into a dead end. Under such

conditions a third-party role may be possible, but it remains to be determined whether such intervention is desirable. It is the perception that the situation has become intolerable that causes parties to change their costing processes and makes bilateral options or joint solutions conceivable. This realization often occurs when the weaker party begins to rise in power relative to the dominant party. The ripe moment is the point at which the process switches from track one (unilateral) to track two (multilateral) action. The question, in terms of meaningful intervention opportunity, is whether a third party has the skill to increase the attractiveness of the negotiation option.

Mandell felt that there was a need for an "early warning analytical capability" beyond an intelligence function. However, it was noted that even the identification of "the" ripe moment does not guarantee successful intervention. For example, overcommitment by third parties may compromise the success of intervention. Also, it was argued that the impact of intervening influences had to be accommodated in any strategy formulation. Furthermore, the mediator may mismanage its use of carrots and sticks, which points to the importance of synchronizing intervention efforts and sequencing initiatives. A final consideration mentioned, was the impact of interested versus disinterested third party intervenors in the conflict management and resolution process.

The work of Edward Azar, as well as John Burton, was cited as notable challenges to the Zartman type of analysis. In the context of their work, it could be argued that the analysis of a ripe moment focusses on the wrong problem because it concentrates on the role of the external intervenor rather than the root of social conflict, which, in Azar's analysis, is the neglect of human identity needs, values and interests. Within this framework, trying to exploit a ripe

moment is only a "damage limitation strategy" which may entail its own costs and further exacerbate the problem. Mandell concluded by advocating that mediation be complimented with other forms of intervention.

Toward a Contingency Approach to Third-Party Intervention in Regional Conflict

Professor Ronald J. Fisher and
Dr. Loraleigh Keashly (University of Saskatchewan)

The presentation outlined the social-psychological side of conflict by examining the impact of our fundamental assumptions about the nature of conflict, including the influence of perception, on the process of conflict.

Two contending approaches to the definition of the nature of conflict were presented--the objectivist and the subjectivist. Each was argued to entail different views on the role of third party intervention in conflict resolution. The former argues that objective incompatibility exists between parties in a conflict, whereas the latter emphasizes the impact of the perception of incompatibilities on the conflict process. It was argued that mediation has tended towards the objectivist view of conflict, and to the extent that we buy into this objectivist view, we select only those third-party intervention strategies that reflect this orientation. For example, the objectivist view (framing resolution in terms of a "balance of settlement") would tend to see compromise, yielding, or winner-take-all, as possible outcomes. The subjectivist view, on the other hand, seeks through consultation to open up a range of outcomes and possibilities (such as the accommodation of all demands) by facilitating shared perceptions and common definition of the problem and issues. Although these two views are not mutually exclusive, the presentors argued that we have tended to emphasize the

objectivist view at the expense of the subjectivist view and have therefore neglected the impact of perceptions, aims, and preferences in conflict situations.

Within a contingency approach, conflict was explained to be a "dynamic process of subjective and objective elements that vary in the primacy of their influence throughout the course of a conflict and over different conflicts. That is, these elements vary in the centrality of their role in escalating and, hence, their potential for de-escalating the process."

Following a brief review of the major contibutors to the development of social-psychological approaches to conflict analysis and diagnosis (Azar, Burton, Beres and Schmit, Deutsch, Kelman and Cohen--refer to Appendix E), the importance of sequencing conflict intervention was addressed. The presentation contrasted two "types" of third-party intervention which appear to differ in the emphasis placed on substantive (interests) versus interaction/process issues, i.e., mediation versus consultation. The chart in Appendix V illustrates the subjective and objective influences of a conflict dynamic which must form the basis for an appropriate and effective intervention strategy. Drawing on Glasl's stages of escalation (1982), and Azar's notion of longitudinal protractedness (1983), it was argued that intervention must correspond to the structure and dynamic of conflict escalation. Thus any management or resolution strategy (conciliation, consultation, negotiation, power intervention) must be sequenced to correspond to the conflict.

Discussion

In the ensuing discussion, it was pointed out by David Leyton-Brown (York University) that the concepts of "hurting stalemate" and the ripe moment seemed to contain two assumptions that require further examination. First, there is the assumption that unless the "objective" moment of a "hurting stalemate" is achieved, then the situation must get worse before it gets better. The "distressful" result is that more destruction may be "necessary" before intervention is deemed appropriate. Second, the assumption of "the ripe moment" is that the relationship between the two parties must be such that the possibility of a joint solution becomes apparent. This was argued to be limited, and limiting, because it neglects mixed motive interaction; that is, there can be tacit norms, as well as common interests, that guide adversarial interaction within a conflict. Because cooperation and competition can exist simultaneously within a conflict, the identification of "the" ripe moment may be problematic. This implies that there may exist a number of "limited ripe moments" for intervention, rather than "a" single ripe moment.

In response, Brian Mandell acknowledged the importance of these considerations in the determination of an intervention strategy. Whether a conflict must get worse before it gets better is context-specific and dependent on such factors as level of outside support and indigenous support. It was also agreed that there could, indeed, be more than one ripe moment. Moreover, Mandell noted that the question of ripe for whom also demanded attention.

Further discussion revolved around the distinction between mediation and consultation made by Fisher and Keashly. It was asked whether intervention required the same mediator at all stages, or a number of different mediators throughout the various stages of management or resolution. Keashly explained that different stages require different intervention skills and that different forms of intervention may occur simultaneously; thus necessitating a number of different intervenors with different skills.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Professor Chris Brown (Carleton University)

Professor Brown felt that the discussion of variables which facilitate or impede regime formation in Southern Africa rested on a dubious presupposition. The question in his view is not "how do we foster cooperation" but rather, "should we foster cooperation" in Southern Africa. Furthermore, he asked whether this orientation implied or conferred a certain degree of legitimacy to the parties involved. The problem in the Southern African case was argued to be the illegitimacy of one of the actors involved. In the same way that one would not form a security regime with Hitler's Germany (cf. Nye 1987, p.377), Professor Brown argued that one would not attempt to form a security regime with apartheid South Africa. The root of the Southern Africa conflict was identified as apartheid. Therefore, the precondition for resolution is the elimination of apartheid.

With these reservations in mind, Professor Brown addressed three core questions concerning regimes. First, is there a security regime in Southern Africa? While there are tacit and explicit rules of conduct that are sufficient to contain the conflict, Brown considered these rules to

constitute a de facto security relationship, not a security regime. "The present relationship is adequately explained with reference to military and economic power". Although these rules "serve to contain the conflict and prevent significant escalation," they do not resolve the conflict; they perpetuate it. Second, do the conditions exist for the formation of a security regime? After concluding that none of Jervis' conditions for the formation of a security regime are met in the Southern African case, Brown argued that the prospects for a future security regime were bleak because the South African government understands that military aggression and regional destabilization work as a means of maintaining its national security. Furthermore, South Africa can be identified as a "revolutionary power" (cf. Nye 1987, p.377) driven by the ideology of apartheid, which defines the mere existence of anti-apartheid states as a threat--thus precluding regime formation. Third, what actions can be taken by third parties to resolve conflict? Since the root to Southern African conflict is apartheid, resolution must begin by changing South African domestic politics. This constitutes the logic for sanctions and other coercive measures against South Africa as a means of conflict resolution. It was added that support for the SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) states can act as a stop-gap measure to aid in mitigating the impact of South Africa's policy of regional destabilization.

South Africa

Dan O'Meara (Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe -- CIDMAA)

As a preface to his presentation, Mr. O'Meara agreed with Professor Brown that a security regime is neither possible nor desirable in Southern Africa. However, he disputed Brown's contention that South Africa is not interested in overthrowing

the governments in the region. Lesotho was cited as an example of a South African-instigated overthrow. It was suggested that South Africa has similar designs in Angola and Mozambique. In analyzing the utility of the concept of regime, O'Meara pointed out that it implicitly supports the status quo, which is not a neutral object, least of all in Southern Africa.

South Africa was characterized as a country of extreme imbalances. Three categories of imbalances were identified as particularly prominent: prior beliefs, power, and perception and learning. Of these, South Africa's perception of itself and its role in the region was seen as central. These perceptual imbalances were dealt with in terms of the content of perception and the processes which reinforce these perceptions. The main South African perceptions are that: i. it confronts a "total onslaught" by a collection of external actors which reinforces the perception that South Africa must ultimately rely on itself and that any alliance is only conditional; ii. no effective (as opposed to symbolic) external force can be brought against it due to prevailing geopolitical realities; and iii. power can be effectively used in all its dimensions (economic, political, military) as a means of furthering domestic and regional policy. With respect to the final perception, O'Meara suggested that although South Africa feels that no government within the region can challenge its dominance (and that thus far it has been able to "live with the costs" of a destabilization strategy), the apparent stalemate in Angola may be starting to challenge this perception.

It was explained that the internal decision making process of South Africa reinforces the perception that the use of force is effective. This has been facilitated by a shift in institutional decision making structures (and therefore

power structures) in which the locus has been transferred from the Cabinet to the security actors of the State Security Council (SSC). The SCC is accountable only to the president and even sets the agenda for the Cabinet, further reinforcing the content variables above. The rise of the far right and the South African government's successful suppression of the eighteen-month urban black uprising from 1984 has "taught" white South Africa that force works and that regional and international actors are impotent to significantly constrain government behaviour.

O'Meara concluded, like Chris Brown, that intervention must aim to redress these imbalances and that the preconditions to reducing regional conflict is the dismantling of the system of Apartheid.

Discussion

Power Relations and Legitimacy in Regime Formation

Brown's argument that the present situation in Southern Africa could be explained in terms of military and economic power, rather that in terms of a security regime, initiated a vigorous discussion of whether security regimes can exist is asymmetrical power relationships. In this context, Ron Fisher identified power and legitimacy as two dimensions which must be addressed, e.g., legitimacy in what sense or by whose definition? He suggested that his and Keashly's Contingency Approach to conflict intervention may not prove useful in situations of severe power asymmetry, or in which one or more powers are ideologically driven. The concept of a security regime implies that the lesser party must be able to have some impact on the larger power. As well, in the Southern African case, until re-perception occurs in South Africa (as it did in Rhodesia), a security regime will not develop. Dan O'Meara echoed this sentiment when he stated that until there is some

effective restraint on South African power, any attempt to formulate a security regime will be a "non-starter".

The discussion of power asymmetries in Southern Africa turned to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The question formulated in discussion asked how power imbalances ought to be redressed and whether the military dimension must be central to regime development. A number of other questions arose which highlighted avenues for further research. Do Western countries adequately appreciate the costs to Southern Africa of confrontation in Angola? Does this situation require the West to develop a supportive diplomatic relationship with Cuba, or even supply military support to shore up Angolan (Cuban) ability to resist South African intrusions? If redressing the power imbalances in Southern Africa requires military inputs, should we not consider supplying the SADCC states with the military means to resist South Africa as well?

Citing the West's changed attitude towards the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchia, Dr. Ernie Gilman (Department of National Defence) pointed out that the definition and criteria of legitimacy are situation-specific. In particular, he asked whether legitimacy is a function of the degree of internal popular support. If so, then, by this criterion, the South African Government could be defined as "illegitimate." However, by the same logic, the high degree of popular support for the Nazi Party in Hitler's Germany would define it as "legitimate."

Theoretical Considerations

David Leyton-Brown further developed the discussion by pointing out that the assumption that a security regime does not exist in Southern Africa rests on as assumption regarding the nature of a security regime. Whereas some analysts view a

security regime as a "good thing," others view it simply as a non-normative analytical construct which can exist whether its content is desirable or not. In contrast to Nye's analysis, Leyton-Brown contended that there was, in fact, a security regime (albeit minimal) with Nazi Germany during World War II. Similarly, a minimal security regime was argued to exist in Southern Africa. Leyton-Brown felt that it would be wrong to discount the analytical utility of regime theory merely because one does not agree with the particular nature of a security relationship.

Elaborating on this point, Professor Doug Anglin (Carleton University) emphasized the need to distinguish between hegemonic regimes and those in which power is more equally distributed, regardless of whether a regime is "liked or not." In his view, there are clearly identifiable rules which govern the conduct of actors within Southern Africa. The pre-eminent rule is that South Africa sets the rules, but is not compelled to abide by them. Further rules suggested by Anglin are: there is to be no interference in the domestic politics of South Africa; South Africa can, and will, police the other states in the region; no non-regional power may interfere in the region without first going through Pretoria; and regional problems must be solved regionally.

Professor Keith Krause (York University) contributed to further critical analysis by arguing that the question of regime formation may depend on the existence of norms, as much as on the existence of rules: "what are the underlying norms that make general tacit rules in a regime?" Krause observed that discussion had presented two points of view: one holds that where there are rules there is a regime (Leyton-Brown); the other holds that rules are necessary but not sufficient determinants for regime formation (Brown). Leyton-Brown agreed with Krause's observation, but added that it is

necessary to determine what norms are desirable in the context of a regime.

A sub-theme in discussion was the debate concerning whether the objective of a security regime is the management or resolution of regional conflict. It was strongly felt by many participants that the mere management of conflict in Southern Africa is an inherently biased and conservative act which inhibits the search for solutions. It was felt that management does nothing to redress the severe power imbalances in Southern Africa which is the prerequisite to conflict resolution.

In response to challenges to the analytical utility of the notion of security regime, Professor Hampson argued that regime theory contained considerable utility as a descriptive device. Summing up discussion, Hampson observed that there appeared to be agreement on the existence of a hegemonic-exploitative situation in Southern Africa which is governed by a number of identifiable rules. The question being debated was whether these rules constitute a regime. The discussion prompted many questions which deserve further examination. What kind of regimes should third parties try to promote and how should they go about it? In this regard, it was suggested that mediation be viewed as merely one of a number of possible instruments to affect regime formation (other possible instruments being the use of economic or military force). What should the objectives of a regime be? It was suggested that, at a minimum, a security regime in Southern Africa should embody the principle of the non-intervention of South Africa into the SADCC states.

The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Conflict

Professor Robert Matthews (University of Toronto)

The utility of regime theory in the Southern Africa context was questioned from the outset of Professor Matthew's presentation. In particular, it was suggested that the concept of regime may be more appropriately applied to an interstate, rather than intrastate, level of analysis because the objectives of parties in each situation are different. In the Rhodesian-Zimbabwe case, the internal conflict was painted in terms of the incompatible goals of the parties involved--the exclusive control over the state apparatus. At the regional level, the very desirability of a regime in Southern Africa was challenged. It was argued that there had been a "robust," but tacit, security regime in Southern Africa from 1965-74, (in which the Portuguese and Pretoria supported the White Rhodesian Government, economically, militarily and diplomatically); it was, however, a regime which Matthews did not support. In the case where a regime is undesirable, the guiding question asks not "how we might prevent the erosion of regimes" but rather "how we might destroy them." It was asserted that the language of regimes was not necessary to effectively describe regional relations.

Matthews explained that the Rhodesian-Zimbabwean experience is best understood in the context of the series of five initiatives intended to resolve the dispute, rather than to analyze it in terms of a regime framework. The five initiatives were: 1) the Vorster-Kaunda Talks leading to the Victoria Falls Talks (1975); 2) the Kissinger Initiatives (1976) leading to the Geneva Talks; 3) the Anglo-American Owan-Young Initiative (1977); 4) the domestic internal initiative between Smith and local black African leaders (excluding the Patriotic Front); and 5) the final settlement

in the Lancaster House negotiations. These initiatives were put forward as critical points of reference in understanding the dynamics of successful third party intervention in conflict resolution.

Discussion

David Leyton-Brown argued that regime concepts could, in fact, be quite useful in understanding the Rhodesian/ Zimbabwean conflict. As well, the examination of this particular case study may help to illustrate the utility of regime analysis. The fact that there was a clearly identifiable regime in the 1965-74 period which did not persist prompted Leyton-Brown's observation that; "what regime theory does give us is not only a set of concepts and tools for comprehending the state of reality at a given moment ...it also gives us an opportunity and requirement to focus upon change. It forces us to examine why regimes not only are formed but why they decompose. What are the pressures that lead to the transformation from one regime to another?"

The influence of perception and re-perception in conflicts formed the basis for Ron Fisher's question of why parties in the Rhodesian conflict chose to enter into formal negotiations in 1979 rather than continue with the military option. Matthews responded that external actors such as the Commonwealth States and Mozambique (through its close relations with ZANU) applied considerable pressure on the Patriotic Front to enter into negotiations and attempted to convince the Patriotic Front that it had the most to win in formal negotiations. The ability of Lord Carrington to prod parties into agreement by playing off their fears and expectations was also noted as an important influence contributing to re-perception.

STRATEGIES OF DE-ESCALATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT

Louis Kriesberg (Syracuse University)

Louis Kriesberg began his presentation with a review of his work on social conflict and noted that de-escalation appeared to be a neglected area of study. In a brief presentation, three conditions relevant to mediation were put forward: international context, domestic conditions, and adversarial relations. In the international context, three considerations were identified: how does the region fit in the sphere of other powers; how is a particular conflict interrelated with other conflicts (over time and space); and what is the interplay and impact of respective networks of enemies and allies. In addressing the domestic conditions relevant to mediation, Kriesberg warned of the dangers of reifying the state. He argued that the domestic constituency has its own internal dynamics separate from the international environment and few domestic changes are in response to external stimuli. The final condition of adversarial relations included consideration of how adversaries relate to each other and who should be included in a regime--as such, the analytical boundaries of a regime are ambiguous.

Kriesberg then turned to de-escalation strategies. It was argued that any strategy must combine three major components. First, careful consideration must be given to the determination of the major parties in an attempt at settlement Those parties willing and able to disrupt an agreement were argued to be important inclusions in any de-escalation strategy. Second, the role of inducements must be appreciated and calibrated to suit the situation. It was observed that the workshop had tended to think in terms of force and coercion. However, we must include consideration of the possible benefits that people may see to a settlement. Third, issues must be carefully considered to ascertain the sequence

in which they should be addressed. Should some issues be linked? These components can be combined in different ways at different times depending on the nature of the conflict being addressed.

The history of Soviet-American relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict were used as case studies to illustrate two examples of de-escalatory processes. Forty years ago, central Europe appeared to be an intractable conflict, whereas the Middle East appeared tractable ("the sand would settle"). The analysis of these two contrasting experiences can contribute to furthering our understanding of de-escalation processes. What lessons can be learned through a comparison of these cases? What were the "little settlements" through the transition of forty years that allowed for positive transformation in Central Europe? Conversely, what were the processes in the Middle East which precipitated the escalation of violence? Kriesberg speculated that the different ways with which refugees were dealt may partially account for the different outcomes in the two cases. A series of questions were posed to help focus analysis on the de-escalation process. How and why was the status quo accepted in one case, but not in the other? From whose perspective is conflict being considered? Does analysis adequately consider short, medium and long-term dimensions of the conflict and of conflict management? What is the ripe moment; ripe for what; ripe for whom; in what time frame; and for what purpose? Does stopping the prospect of escalation in itself lead to settlement?

Discussion

Discussion began with the question "why isn't de-escalation simply escalation in reverse?" One reason put forward to explain why it is not simply a process of "climbing

down the same steps that adversaries went up," is that parties become more committed as the struggle goes on. Kriesberg added that conflict escalation reinforces hardline policies because those within institutions that reject policy are marginalized from the decision-making process.

There was general agreement with the view that there is no set formula for de-escalation and that it is dependent on the abilities of a mediator, the external pressures, the availability and effectiveness of inducements, and general conditions. Fen Hampson refined this observation by noting that Professor Kriesberg had provided a "checklist" rather than a "theory" of de-escalation. This, he suggested, is because there is no real strategy for de-escalation. If the process of de-escalation is not linear, then is it meaningful to talk of de-escalation unless a starting and end point can be identified? In response, Kriesberg stated that, empirically, one must establish these positions. However, many social forces are not manipulable and it was acknowledged that de-escalation is, indeed, a "muddy process."

THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Douglas Anglin (Carleton University)

In the introduction to his presentation Professor Anglin made it clear that he would be concentrating on the "stage prior to the stage" of negotiation and conflict resolution. He then provided a brief review of the sanctions campaign to date, noting that a short international attention span and doubts concerning the effectiveness of sanctions have resulted in what he termed "sanctions fatigue." The South African Government's successful suppression of the insurrections in the townships has further blunted the belief in the efficacy of international sanctions.

Strategies for Change

To be effective, a sanctions strategy must specify its objectives. It is commonly claimed that the primary objective of a sanctions strategy is fundamental change--the dismantling of apartheid. Anglin argued that the objective is justice, which is not necessary synonymous with peace, growth or development. A number of approaches were put forward as means of attaining this objective. One approach, epitomized by the "constructive engagement" policy and appeasement of the Reagan administration, is conversion: that is, white South Africans should be "re-educated" to enable them to appreciate their "true interests" and the "error of their ways." The second approach seeks to topple the "regime" through protracted armed struggle, which would undoubtedly entail economic dislocation and probably external intervention. This, in Anglin's estimation, seems the most likely of scenarios. The final approach put forward was dialogue--meaningful negotiation towards a strategy for final change. This approach must specify who wields power in Southern Africa. In principle, all parties support dialogue; however, in practice, it is much more difficult since Pretoria maintains that the "pillars of apartheid" are non-negotiable. In light of white South African intransigence, it is "inconceivable" that this strategy could succeed without the application of force on the white community from outside (e.g. sanctions) and from inside (e.g. the Black struggle). The pre-eminent question thus becomes; to what extent can sanctions induce parties to come to the bargaining table?

Two views of the role of sanctions in promoting dialogue were presented. The first identifies sanctions as a "peaceful alternative to armed struggle." The second identifies sanctions as a compliment to armed struggle. Although the current Mulroney policy is intended to "bring South Africa to

its senses," Anglin suggested that a "realistic policy" must tilt towards "bringing South Africa to its knees." This prompts the question of the choice of targets in a sanctions strategy. Attempts to force the apartheid Government to redefine its interests are confronted by formidable challenges. Attempts to target the wider white community also tend to be ineffective because of the systematical denial of information necessary to come to a "realistic" assessment of the situation. There is therefore, little hope to divide the white community. The only hope is to erode the white position and lifestyle. In this context, psychological sanctions are meant to demoralize the white population and thereby apply indirect pressure on the apartheid Government.

South Africa is vulnerable to sanctions. However, they have not been as successful as hoped because they "have barely been tried." In order to use economic means effectively to achieve political ends, it must first be determined what the economic and political impact will be. Factors that mitigate against the impact of sanctions include: the South African Government's ability to shift costs of sanctions onto the non-white community; the continued availabilty of oil; and benefits to the white business community derived from the drop in the cost of their exports. Even though sanctions have been selective, sporadic and inadequately enforced, they have nonetheless inflicted some costs on white South Africans. These costs could be made substantial if they were aimed at white South Africa's vulnerabilities. For example, South Africa is dependent on foreign technologies, capital goods (especially defence components), and skilled labour. Professor Anglin suggested that financial sanctions should be considered; for example, taxes on foreign exchange, investment and South African exports.

The Politics of Vulnerability

The South African Government is very anxious to avoid further sanctions and has undertaken an extensive propaganda campaign to counter negative public opinion. Thus far, the South African Government has been content to address mere image problems rather than to change apartheid substantively. Anglin forcefully argued that conditions were not present for dialogue, let alone "ripe for resolution." While there may be a stalemate in South Africa, it is not a "mutually hurting" one because parties to the conflict still believe in the efficacy of unilateral action. It was asked how the ripening process could be accelerated. Anglin's response was that dialogue will not occur until the ripening process has run its course. While he advocated sanctions on an intensified scale, he also maintained that the prospects for early dialogue would be improved with the escalation of military confrontation. In Anglin's view, there is no way to avoid addressing the role of armed struggle in the search for justice in South Africa.

Discussion

Dan O'Meara responded to Professor Anglin's presentation by cautioning against overly optimistic expectations from sanctions. He reminded participants that in the Rhodesian experience, sanctions actually served to strengthen the domestic economy. This possibility should also be considered in evaluating the possible consequences of a sanctions strategy in South Africa. O'Meara also took issue with Anglin's characterization of Afrikaaners as "slow learners" (in Joseph Nye's sense) and argued that when it comes to the choice of "complex learning" or "national suicide," they have proven themselves to be "quick learners." They have learned

that the international community does not follow through with sanctions.

David Leyton-Brown sought clarification of how exactly Anglin defined the objective of sanctions. Presumably, once this objective is achieved sanctions would be lifted. "What are we really after--the initiation of dialogue or the conclusion of dialogue?" If the goal is oriented towards the longer term, then strategies of change must also consider inducements. According to Anglin, the application of sanctions, as a means merely to initiate dialogue, would be inadequate because it would only encourage South Africa to engage in superficial dialogue to deflect international pressure.

Continuing this discussion on the means and ends of sanctions strategies, Steve Lee (CIIPS) pointed to the logical conclusion to Professor Anglin's argument: if sanctions are only a supplement to armed struggle, then why not support armed struggle to avoid the devastation of protracted violence? Anglin responded that although "we" should indeed, support armed struggle, the likelihood of direct military support "is so remote that it is hardly worth discussing."

The dynamic and changing nature of conflict was noted by Ron Fisher. On the one hand, escalation is deemed necessary for the redefinition of interests. Yet, this same process may also exacerbate points of conflict and further compound the complexities of resolution. It was suggested that attention should therefore focus on the "pre-negotiation phase" to find a way out of this dilemma.

The final statement by Professor Anglin pointed to his assessment of the bottom line regarding the role of external intervention in South Africa. Solutions will ultimately come

from inside South Africa. They will not be dictated from outside.

ARMS TRANSFERS, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND REGIME CREATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Keith Krause (York University)

Arms transfers were identified as an important factor in conflict management and regime creation because it is: i. "one of the few mechanisms third parties use to influence the conduct or outcome regional conflict;" and ii. "superpower competition for clients and for influence over regional agendas often translates into arms transfers which can exacerbate regional security problems." The Iran-Iraq war was examined with two questions in mind. First, what have been the results of on-going attempts to resolve the war through the manipulation of arms supplies? Second, what are the possibilitites for creating a condominium that would regulate arms transfers to the region to guarantee regional security, in the interests of major powers?

In elaborating on the details of arms transfer policies to the Gulf region, Krause drew a distinction between two types of influence that suppliers try to exercise: "bargaining power," which is the attempt to alter the costs and benefits associated with specific policy options; and "structural power" which is the attempt to affect military capabilities, alter military options and thereby change military and political goals. The details of the inter-relationships between these two types of power were examined at length. It was concluded that the manipulation of arms transfers by external suppliers may have affected the conduct of war in some way. However, it did not affect the goals of clients.

The manipulation of arms transfers is one means by which external powers may attempt to terminate war. However, in the Iran-Iraq case, an arms embargo is not going to contribute, in a major way, to ending the fighting. Several reasons were suggested: i. "there are cross-pressures that make an embargo not necessarily in the interests of major suppliers;" ii. "even if an embargo was agreed upon, it is unlikely that Western states could enforce it"; and iii. "the connection between the means used and the goals sought is very tenuous." Although the short term manipulation of arms transfers will have little to do with ending the war, they will have a great deal to do with the long term management of the underlying conflict and the maintenance of security.

According to Krause, the conditions necessary for the creation of a regional security regime are as follows: i. "there must be no actors bent on overturning the regional political order"; ii. "all regional actors must accept that external powers have legitimate security interests in the region"; and iii. "external powers must have cross-cutting interests in the region."

The main obstacles to the creation of "some sort of arms transfer regime as a means of long-term conflict management," according to Krause, were as follows: i. revolutionary Iran does not meet the conditions i and ii for the creation of a regional security regime; ii. "difficulty of coordination among arms suppliers;" iii. "the lack of perception in the region that the security of individual Gulf states is inextricably bound together; and iv. "persistent attempts by superpowers to use arms transfer relationships as a tool of bargaining power."

That the Iran-Iraq war was partly the result of the Iraqi perception of threat from the Iranian military build-up (the structural legacy of American Gulf policy from 1972-79), led Krause to conclude that "it is a mistake to focus on the use of positive and negative sanctions (coercion and inducement) because structural power is likely more important."

Discussion

Discussion sought further to clarify the role of arms transfers in the creation and maintenance of a security regime. The contention that all regional actors must accept the legitimacy of external powers' security interests, as a condition for the formation of a regime, was challenged. It was noted that external powers can, in fact, disrupt an otherwise stable situation. It was also not clear to participants whether it was being argued that a security regime was not possible in the Gulf region or that arms-transfer controls were unlikely to play a significant role in the creation of a regime. Professor Hampson suggested that arms-transfer controls may not be important to the creation of a security regime, but that once a regime is in place, these controls may be important to the stability of that regime, e.g. stopping a destabilizing arms race. Professor Leyton-Brown further observed that a security regime must certainly consider arms transfers, but it is inaccurate to equate a security regime with an arms transfer regime. He also identified the problem of confusing two distinct ways of conceptualizing an arms transfer regime. One approach views it as mutually agreed upon and accepted by the recipients, while the other views it as imposed by the suppliers. He noted that the concept of regime might be better considered at the level of acceptance by participants, rather than at the level of imposition by others. Several participants stressed

the importance of making explicit the objectives of an arms transfer regime--is it de-escalation or resolution?

THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT

Professor Ashok Kapur (University of Waterloo)

The central thesis of Professor Kapur's presentation was that there is a security regime "in the making" in the Indian Subcontinent, particularly since 1971. It is a regime which is Indo-centric, that is, it is a regime that is "managed by India." While the workshop considered the role of third parties in regime creation, the "Indian approach reveals the explicit rejection of the idea of third-party mediation and a mistrust of any kind of a superpower role in regime development." The regime is power oriented in the sense that its stability rests on asymmetry of military power. However, such asymmetries also create strains between India (the regional hegemon) and the "smaller" regional states, giving rise to the problem of achieving consent among regional actors.

Kapur argued that in the Subcontinental context, the regime can be analyzed in terms of four dimensions: i. the incidents of war and the ability of a regime to prevent the outbreak of war; ii. the extent to which a situation of "competitive coexistence" between India and Pakistan is maintained; iii. the commonality of approach in avoiding third-party mediation and the common acceptance of bilateralism in resolving regional disputes; and iv. an open border, as well as robust economic and commercial relations. It was argued that the final dimension was not yet in place, and would constitute more than simply a security regime but a political, economic and cultural regime.

Kapur argued that intra-regional relations could be characterized in terms of a number of principles. These were listed as follows: i. do not militarily attack your neighbour; ii. always keep the negotiating process alive especially in a crisis; iib. always keep channels of communication open at all levels; iii. keep the military option active where ethnic conflict in a neighbouring state is likely to spill over (in spite of this principle's contradiction with principle i.); iv. bilateral problems must be sorted out by the countries concerned (based on the assumption that there are no impartial outsiders); and v. the principle of military asymmetry in India's favour, which is based on two "elements" - that the territorial status quo after 1971 should form the basis of regime development, and that Pakistan has resigned itself to the fact that it will never acquire Kashmir.

It was argued that the interstate process in the nascent subcontinental regime is intended to modify behaviour through the use of force to create the fear of punishment. Although this was the basis of the 1971 confrontation, such behaviour modification is an insufficient foundation for a durable regime. In Kapur's view, the Indo-Pakistan relationship can be characterized as progressing from a "military constituency" into that of competitive coexistence. The possibility of developing a relationship of "cooperative coexistence" was argued to be very much on the agenda, if not yet in evidence.

Discussion

Professor Anglin opened the discussion by asking whether two salient characteristics of the Subcontinental regime could be generalized and applied to security regimes in other contexts. Observing that the Indo-Pakistani regime appeared to be a "slightly camouflaged hegemonic regime," it was asked

whether all regimes must then be hegemonic. Secondly, Anglin questioned whether the strong status quo bias apparent in the regime was also an essential prerequisite for all regimes.

The evolving nature of nuclear weapons capability in the Subcontinent prompted Keith Krause to ask how this may affect the evolution of the Indo-Pakistani security regime. He suggested that the development of indigenous nuclear weapons might reduce asymmetries; however, whether this would contribute to the formation or destruction of a regime is uncertain. In Kapur's view, nuclear weapons would not change the structure of power in the Indian Subcontinent and is therefore not a central factor in the analysis of regime formation.

Although it was argued that the present regime actively excluded third-party intervention in regional matters, Harald von Riekhoff (CIIPS) observed that Canada had played an important mediatory role in the early years of the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Noted in discussion were the contributions of General McNaughton, Chester Ronning and others, who encouraged direct Indo-Pakistan communication and who facilitated the use of international mediation mechanisms for the resolution of regional conflict.

The impact of US-Pakistan relations and Sino-Indian relations was addressed but viewed by Professor Kapur as inconsequential for Subcontinental regime formation. However, one element that was viewed as potentially destabilizing to regime formation was the spill-over of ethnic conflict from India into neighbouring countries (as opposed to India's response to the spill-over of ethnic conflict from neighbouring countries into India). Kapur responded that while these tendencies "contribute to mistrust, they do not eliminate the basic principles of regime formation. They slow

down the process of regime building but they do not eliminate the principles of the regime".

CENTRAL AMERICA

Liisa North (The Jesuit Centre)

Liisa North sought to identify the constituent elements of a new regime that may be emerging in Central America as manifest in the treaties drafted by the Contadora group, as well as the Arias Plan that culminated in the Esquipulas II Accord of 7 August 1987. It was noted that these efforts all addressed the inter- and intra-state dimensions, including the superpower dimension.

North argued that the new regime is opposed by the United States because it threatens the "old regime" which was characterized by: US hegemony in internal Latin American affairs; the domination or rule of interrelated traditional preditory elites firmly aligned with the U.S.; and the political and military weakness of "counter-hegemonic alternatives." The breakdown of the old regime was attributed to intrastate conflicts and therefore, any new regime must adequately resolve them. Archaic and repressive political systems, inequitable social and economic order, and increasing marginalization of rural populations were identified as "critical for understanding the origins of internal conflicts and the therefore also the breakdown of the old security regime."

Elements of the New Security Regime

It was argued that Contadora and Esquipulas II are "self-consciously directed towards creating a new security regime." The first element of the new regime is the reduction of intrastate conflict as embodied in proposals intended to

achieve national reconciliation, democratization and redistributive reforms. The transformation of the old internal orders was seen to be a prerequisite to the formation of a new regime. In this regard, North argued that the Esquipulas II Accord amounts to the recognition of all existing governments (above all, the legitimacy of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua) and the opening up of discussions with all opposition forces including the armed movements in El Salvador and Guatemala. This was contrasted with the US position which is "predicated on the military defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and also the military defeat of the revolutionary forces elsewhere". It was further argued that Esquipulas II "denies the superpowers the veto over the form of government which they had traditionally exercised in the region". Thus, North stressed that Central America is today undergoing a transition to a new security regime which makes the determination of its viability difficult.

The conditions which led to the willingness of the Central Americans to work towards the formation of an indigenous security regime arose because of: different Latin and American perceptions of the nature of the problems in the region; the "exhaustion of war" or "hurting stalemate;" and the Central American belief that the United States would not, or could not, commit sufficient resources to attain its objectives (or those of its allies in the region). Other factors that were mentioned (and more fully discussed in the working paper found in Appendix XX) were: the Iran-Contra Affair; creative leadership by Arias; and the emergence of peace constituencies in the Central American countries.

North felt that although the Esquipulas II Accord has not yet been fully complied with, it has opened "political spaces" for debate and discussion within Central American states.

However, without minimizing the role of the Central American States themselves, North argued that ultimately, "it will be the US posture that will largely determine the speed with which a new regime will emerge".

Discussion

In response to a question asking what the role of third parties might be in facilitating regime formation, North identified the Contadora Group as a third party that maintained an atmosphere conducive to continued dialogue throughout the formative stages of regime development. It was also suggested that third parties might be able to play a constructive verification role. North also responded positively to the question of whether there exists an opening for mediation between Nicaragua and the United States. The Canadian Government and Western European Governments were identified as potentially viable intervenors because of their position as "good allies" of the USA. It was argued that the peace process is critically dependent upon an improvement of the economic situation in Central America. In this context, third party economic assistance, infrastructural aid (similar to the Marshall Plan), aid for the revitalization of regional trade, and diplomatic support were identified as crucial to the continuation of the peace process.

WORKSHOP CONCLUSION

Fen Hampson opened the discussion by addressing three questions that had been explicit throughout the workshop: i. do security regimes exist in a regional setting, and if so, what are their characteristics; ii. if security regimes do exist what are the conditions for their creation and can we draw generalizations; and iii. if they exist, what is their net contribution to conflict management and resolution?

Professor Hampson felt that regimes were, in fact, evident in the case studies addressed in the workshop, although they exhibited great variation across regions. In response to question ii., Professor Hampson added a number of conditions deemed necessary for the formation of a regional security regime, namely: i. the desire to keep Superpowers out of the region; ii. a common language or common sense of cultural identity; iii. changing economic conditions (i.e., although improvement in economic relations can provide the impetus for regime formation, deterioration of economic relations may also be necessary to move parties towards regime formation). To question iii., Hampson argued that the contribution of security regimes to conflict management is usually positive. That is, it limits conflict, even if the nature of the regime is not liked. It was also observed that a regime can either hinder or facilitate the resolution process, as illustrated in Southern Africa and the Indian Subcontinent cases respectively--depending on the characteristics of the regime (objectives, structure, members, etc.). The status quo nature of the security regime was acknowledged. However, whether this is a "good or a bad thing" depends on the circumstances. Professor Hampson concluded his remarks by formulating a fourth question: "what is the role that third parties, broadly defined, can play in developing a security regime?"

Professor Leyton-Brown observed that the workshop had concentrated on the worst cases, and if in these seemingly intractable conflicts security regimes can be discerned, then they "surely must exist" elsewhere. For analytical balance, one could have analyzed those cases in which security regimes unambigiously exist, e.g. Canada-US and Western Europe. In light of the question of what conditions are conducive to regime formation, Professor Leyton-Brown drew upon early regime literature and recalled three distinct types of regime which are differentiated on the basis of the degree of

voluntarily accepted restraint: coercive, spontaneous, and negotiated regimes. The conditions for the creation of a regime it was argued, are dependent on the type of regime under discussion. For a regime to be analytically identifiable, there must more than simply ad hoc behaviour or regularity; there must be the convergence of expectations. However, "if a regime provides a kind of framework for interpretation by which expectations of others' behaviour can be judged in advance, and therefore provide some degree of predictibility of behaviour in a conflict situation, then it is clearly playing a role in management and, potentially, resolution of conflict." Leyton-Brown felt that whether as a party to the conflict or as a third party, the aim of a regime is to encourage the convergence of expectations around a preferred set of norms, rules, principles and procedures.

To this point Keith Krause added that a regime must be more than simply the convergence of expectations; it should be "more than an alliance between states that pose no discernable threat to each other," otherwise alliance theory or balance of power theory would adequately explain this relationship. He continued by refining Professor Hampson's point that regional actors in a regime tend to actively <u>exclude</u> superpower involvement. More specifically, he felt a precondition to regime formation is that regional actors "desire to <u>control</u> the way that superpowers participate so that the regional conflict preserves its integrity as a regional conflict." On a similar note, Steve Lee offered an additional precondition to regional regime formation--a common threat perception. In his final point, Krause noted the distinction between contractual and coercive consent and suggested that this same distinction may prove useful in the analysis of hegemonic regimes. In particular, if rule (as opposed to norm) implies a sanction, then the relationship is clearly hegemonic, and the framework of regime is not useful. Hampson defended the

utility of the concept of regime, by arguing that concepts like the balance of power lack the analytical sophistication necessary to describe the nature and scope of the interactions of the conflictual and cooperative elements of an adversarial relationship.

Professor Fisher closed discussion by highlighting the issues that he felt were salient to third party intervention in conflict management and resolution. In the consultation model, third party was used in a "more restricted sense" to refer, not merely to any external actor, but to a party which "comes in with some degree of impartiality and is to some extent invited in." Fisher made the observation that there is often the tendency to view impartial third party intervenors as coming from outside of a region. "Yet, what is happening in the Central American process leads one to think that perhaps only that initiative from within is the one that could succeed in the face of the American presence." The problems of legitimacy and asymmetry of power, in terms of the actors within regimes, as well as potential intervenors, were identified as "tough questions" that need to be examined further.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gross Stein, Janice, "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," International Journal, 11, Autumn 1985.

Jervis, Robert, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 357-379.

Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.

Krasner, Stephen D., International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organizations, Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 371-403.

Young, Oran R., "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," World Politics, 39, October 1986, pp.

Zartman, I. William, Ripe for Resolution, Oxford University Press, 1983.

APPENDIX A

CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

"Managing Regional Conflict" Workshop

Workshop Participants

6 - 7 May 1988

1. Professor Christopher Brown
   Carleton University

2. Professor David Leyton-Brown
   York University

3. Professor Ashok Kapur
   University of Waterloo

4. Professor Robert Matthews
   University of Toronto

5. Mr. Dan O'Meara
   Director of Research
   Centre d'Information et Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique astrale (CIDMAA)

6. Ms Liisa North
   The Jesuit Centre

7. Professor Brian Mandell
   Carleton University

8. Professor Brian Tomlin
   Carleton University

9. Professor Ronald Fisher
   University of Saskatchewan

10. Ms Loraleigh Keashly
    University of Saskatchewan

11. Professor Douglas Anglin
    Carleton University

12. Professor Ed Dosman
    York University

13. Professor Louis Kriesberg
    Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Syracuse

14. Colonel Gerry Thompson
Directorate of International Policy
Department of National Defence

15. Professor John Sigler
Carleton University

16. Dr. Ernie Gilman
Director
Directorate of Strategic Analysis
Department of National Defence

17. Mr. Jim Levitt
Latin America Division
Department of External Affairs

18. Mr. Steve Godfrey
Executive Director
United Nations Association

19. Professor Jozef Lapid
Political Science
Carleton University

20. Ms Cynthia Sampson
Christian Science Monitor
Harvard Law School

21. Professor Keith Krause
Political Science
York University

22. Mr. Roger Hill
Director of Research
CIIPS

23. Professor Harald von Riekhoff
Research Fellow
CIIPS

24. Mr. Steve Lee
Research Associate
CIIPS

25. Colonel Robert Mitchell
Research Fellow
CIIPS

26. Professor Fen Hampson
Research Associate, CIIPS
Carleton University

APPENDIX B

KEY CONCEPTS USED IN THE WORKSHOP

Regime

"The concept of international regime was borrowed from international law and broadened to incorporate the whole range of principles, norms, rules and procedures which constrain states' behavior and around which actors' expectations converge within a given issues" (Nye 1987, 374; cf. Krasner 1983). For a regime to exist, it must provide an "independent causal effect" that cannot be explained by rules of prudence derived from short-run self-interest of states (Nye 1987, 393).

"Regimes can affect learning and state behavior in several ways. The principles and norms of the regime may be internalized by states or by important groups within states. This process raises the costs of defecting from cooperative solutions and makes it more important to establish a reputation for reciprocity. Secondly, regimes may provide information which alters the way key participants in the state understand their interests, or they may see cause and effect relationships that were not previously understood. Included in this information may be procedures for transparency and timely warning through inspection or verification, which then tend to discourage worst-case assumptions. More specifically, the institutionalization of regimes can: 1) change standard operating procedures for national bureaucracies; 2) present new coalition opportunities for subnational actors and improved access for third parties; 3) change participants' attitudes through contacts within the framework of institutions; and 4) provide means to dissociate a particular issue from changes in the overall political relationship by regular, formal meetings. If regimes make a difference, we should see different behavior between those areas of security cooperation where regimes exist and those where they do not." --(Nye 1987, 400)

Ripe Moment and Hurting Stalemate

"The point when conflict is ripe for resolution is associated with two different sorts of intensity--called here plateaus and the precipice--which produce different sorts of pressure--called respectively deadlocks and deadlines. A plateau and its deadlock begin when one side is unable to achieve its aims, to resolve the problem, or to win the conflict by itself, and they are completed when the other side arrives at a similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A plateau must be perceived by both not as a

momentary resting ground, but as a hurting stalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for graceful escape.

Conflict resolution plays on perceptions of an intolerable situation: Things 'can't go on like this.' Without this perception, the conciliator must persuade the parties that escalation to break out of deadlock is impossible. Indeed, the conciliator may even be required to make it impossible, if necessary. Thus, deadlock cannot be seen merely as a temporary stalemate, to be easily resolved in one's favor by a little effort or even by a big offensive or a gamble or foreign assistance. Rather, each party must recognize its opponent's strength and its own inability to overcome it.

For the conciliator, this means emphsizing the dangers of deadlock as each party comes to recognize the other's strength. Each party's unilateral policy (the action that it can take alone without negotiation) must be seen as a more expensive and less likely way of achieving a possible, acceptable outcome than the policy of negotiation. A plateau is thus as much a matter of perception as of reality for the parties and as much a subject of persuasion as of timing for conciliator. Successful conciliation produces a shift from a winning mentality to a conciliating mentality on the part of both sides." --(Zartman 1983, 232)

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

(Fen Hampson)

1) Does the notion of "security regime" (defined broadly according to the typlogy suggested in Figure 1, Appendix D) apply to the regional setting? That is to say, are interstate security relationships in some regions characterized by some level of tacit, informal, or formal cooperation?

2) If cooperation does exist, what is the nature of the cooperative relationship? What are the norms or rules of cooperation?

3) To what extent are these cooperative relationships institutionalized?

4) What conditions or factors led/might lead to the creation of a cooperative security regime?

5) How robust or durable is the security regime? Do the conditions or factors which led to the creation of regime still hold today? (Or what set of minimal conditions is necessary to create a cooperative security regime?)

6) What factors or conditions might lead to the erosion or weakening of the security regime? Has erosion taken place?

7) How might such erosion be prevented?

8) How might regional security regimes be created, expanded, or strengthened? What contribution can "regimes" themselves make to "learning" (as defined by Joseph Nye) and further cooperation?

9) What role, if any, did/can third parties play in the formation and development of regional security regimes?

10) What role, if any, might third parties play to strengthen the security regime and/or to prevent its erosion?

I have provided a chart (Appendix D) which suggests one way we might want to try to organize these questions and identify the relevant variables for the development of regional security regimes and their maintenance.

APPENDIX D

FIGURE 1

TYPOLOGY OF DIFFERENT SECURITY REGIMES

	Exploitative	Mutually Beneficial
HEGEMONIC	S.AFRICA & FRONTLINE STATES	GCC
BILATERAL		SALT I & II, SINAI AGREEMENTS
MULTILATERAL		NPT, ASEAN, IEA

FIGURE 2



APPENDIX D

FIGURE 3

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE REGIONAL SECURITY	INDEPENDENT OR MANIPULABLE CONDITIONS, INCLUDING ACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES FOR REGIME DEVELOPMENT/ MAINTENANCE	REGIME CHARACTERISTICS	FACTORS THAT MIGHT ERODE SECURITY REGIME
*END OF VIOLENCE	*MEDIATION	*HEGEMONIC BILATERAL MULTILATERAL	*DOMESTIC INSTABILITY
*DOMESTIC POLITICAL STABILITY	*PEACEKEEPING VERIFICATION	*DEGREE/LEVEL OF COOPERATION	*WORSENING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
*"WAR WEARINESS"	*"GOOD OFFICES"		*EMERGENCE OF NEW THREATS
*CHANGES IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS(s)	*DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE		*WITHDRAWAL OF SECURITY GUARANTEES
	*SANCTIONS: ECONOMIC AND MILITARY		*DIMINISHED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
	*SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL/ INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		
	*SECURITY GUARANTEES		

APPENDIX E

TOWARD A CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT

Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher
Department of Psychology
University of Saskatchewan
May, 1988

OUTLINE

Rationale for a contingency approach

1. ASSUMPTION: Our beliefs about the fundamental nature of social conflict, its sources and its functions influences (or determines) what we perceive as possible outcomes and, thus, what we consider to be appropriate and realistic strategies for conflict management or resolution.

   -- need to define our goals for intervention--settlement, management, or resolution.

2. a) Thus, conflict parties and "interested parties" (including potential third parties) essentially define what is considered "appropriate" intervention by virtue of their beliefs.

   b) to the extent that all parties have similar beliefs about the fundamental nature of conflict and, thus, possible outcomes and suitable interventions, there is no "motivation" to explore other conceptualizations.

   c) On the other hand, to the extent the differing conceptions or differential emphasis on aspects of conflict exist and are acknowledged, the possibilities for outcomes and intervention have the potential of being expanded beyond initial conceptualizations.

3. Flowing from this is the possibility of a contingency approach to conflict intervention such that the fuller conflict experience (behavior, attitudes, sources) is open to analysis and, hence, a fuller range of intervention possibilities.

4. ASSUMPTION: Conflict is a dynamic process of objective and subjective elements that vary in the primacy of their influence throughout the course of the conflict and over different conflicts. That is, these elements vary in the centrality of their role in escalating and, hence, their potential for de-escalating the process.

Social psychology of conflict escalation and intervention

5. Social psychology's contribution is from the phenomenological or subjective perspective with a greater emphasis on the process (interaction) than to the content of the conflict. Thus, we have some interesting insights or understandings to offer on the more "subjective" side of conflict.

-- legitimacy of the "subjective" aspects as at points in the conflict, these elements are the "provocative" ones (means-goals--C. Mitchell)

-- subjective elements:
  -- perceptions, cognitions, attitudes and behavior of parties re: each other as distinct entities, their relationship and its characteristics (e.g., trust, communication) and respective goals and motivations (Deutsch).

  -- social context--the development, maintenance, and changing of norms re: conflict behavior--security regimes fall into this category.

-- consultation as a social psychologically based approach.

6. Effective use of a contingency approach to third-party intervention requires "accurate" and "full" analysis (i.e., diagnosis) of the conflict, e.g. Azar, Burton, Beres and Schmidt, Deutsch.

-- usefulness of consultation for the analysis and diagnosis of the conflict;

-- distinction between symptoms and sources of conflict;

-- identification of sources of conflict recognizing the different "levels" of these sources, e.g., needs, interests (e.g., economic, power, value), misperceptions, misattribution;

-- Beres and Schmidt identify five elements of conflict (parties, stages of discord, causes, social context, values) which would influence the type of management strategy;

-- understanding of escalation process (social psychological elements such as minority-majority relations, perceptual, communication, decision-making);

-- Burton, Kelman/Cohen emphasis on interaction analysis is a useful tool here, particularly with respect to the involvement of the parties in the process of identification and priorization of issues and possible solutions.

Sequencing of conflict interventions based on stage of escalation

7. Given "acceptance" of the mixture and diversity of conflict elements and their changing influence through course of the conflict and in different conflicts, we will characterize and look at two "types" of third-party intervention which appear to differ in the emphasis placed on substantive (interests) vs. interaction/process issues.

-- Mediation and consultation--examine differential influence and explore complementarity of the two processes. From this discussion, lay the foundation for the consideration of the following issues:

1) examine the potenial of sequencing of intervention strategies based on conflict sources and conflict characterisitics such as Glasl's stages of escalation and Azar's notion of longitudinal protractedness and goals for the intervention--management, settlement, resolution.

   -- usefulness of consultation in the analysis and diagnosis of these elements: informal, noncommitting nature.
   -- different intervention strategies may have different points of intervention, i.e., different times when the conflict is considered ripe.
   -- for example, using Glasl's model, if conflict escalated to the point of violence and potential for destruction of one or both parties, could go with power intervention to "cool it down," e.g., peacekeeping and then move in with consultation to improve relationship for later mediation on substantive issues. Or would mediate on substantive issues, controlling interparty hostility, realizing the importance of following up on improving the relationship through consultation.

2) the potential PROACTIVE role of consultation in establishing conditions for effective mediation, other interventions or negotiation, e.g., attitude change in White Rhodesians, norms re: conflict and relationship, e.g., security regimes;

-- Beres and Schmidt's social context of dominant norms of interaction--collaborative or competitive.

APPENDIX E

DEUTSCH'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

Major Characteristics (1973)

-- parties respond in terms of perceptions and cognitions of each other
-- parties are influenced by their expectations of each other
-- interaction is initiated by motives and generates new motives
-- interaction takes place in a social environment
-- parties are composed of subsystems but capable of unified action

Cooperative vs. Competitive Social Interaction

	Cooperative	Competitive
Comm.	Open, accurate, relevant	Nonexistent, misleading, espionage
Perc.	Sensitivity to similarities	Sensitivity to differences
Att.	Trusting, friendly, helpful	Suspicious, Hostile, exploitative
Task Or.	Mutual Problem to be solved	Solution is imposed on other coercion, escalation

Deutsch's crude LAW OF SOCIAL RELATIONS: the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship.

In a mixed-motive conflict, cooperation breeds cooperation, competition breeds competition.

Escalation leads to a MALIGNANT SOCIAL PROCESS (1983), i.e., one that is increasingly dangerous and costly and from which the parties see no way of extricating themselves without unacceptable losses.

-- anarchic social situation (no regard for welfare of other)
-- win-lose, competitive orientation (assumes irreconcilability)
-- inner conflicts expressed through external conflict

-- cognitive rigidity (stress; stereotypes not confronted by reality)
-- misjudgements and misperceptions (actor/perceiver differences)
-- unwitting commitments (beliefs to actions; postdecision dissonance reduction strengthens beliefs)
-- self-fulfilling prophecies
-- vicious, escalating spirals (greater risks to justify past investments)
-- gamesmanship orientation: abstract conflict over images of power

APPENDIX E


CONFLICT
(Analysis of the objective and subjective influences)
"Real" conflict of interest
- observer identified
- goal incompatibilities
Conflict based on differing perceptions of issues and goals and motivations of other (Soc. Psych)
Focus on substantive issues
- scarce resources
- land, power
Focus on interaction; dynamics of process; norms of interaction
- perceptions , attitudes, beliefs
INTERVENTION
Content expertise
Information control
Resource control (muscle)
Focus on interests
MEDIATION
Process expertise
Referent power
Interaction analysis
Focus on needs
CONSULTATION
Settlement of issues
- distribution of scarce resources
- balance of gains/losses
Improved relationship
- accurate perceptions of self and other
- shared understanding of issues
- jt. problem solve orient.
"Real" conflict of interest settled.
Subjective aspects handled.

APPENDIX E


SITUATION
Small Group Discussions in a Neutral and Informal Setting
THIRD PARTY IDENTITY
Skilled and Impartial Consultant
THIRD PARTY FUNCTIONS
Induce Positive Motivation
Improve Communication
Diagnose the Conflict
Regulate the Interaction
OBJECTIVES
Improved Attitudes
Improved Relationship and Conflict Resolution
PROGRAM OF THIRD PARTY CONSULTATION
Trusting Respectful and Empathic HELPING RELATIONSHIP
Facilitative and Diagnostic THIRD PARTY ROLE
THIRD PARTY TACTICS AND PROCEDURES
To Carry Out The Role and The Functions

Fig. 1. A Model of Third Party Consultation

APPENDIX E

STAGES OF CONFLICT ESCALATION

DIMENSION OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCE

STAGE	COMMUNICATION	IMAGES/PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIES/RELSHP	ISSUES	OUTCOME/ MANAGEMENT
I	discussion to debate	accurate, trust, respect, solid, committed	positions	joint-gain joint decisions
II	less direct deeds, not words inferences	stereotypes (+/-) images become real other still impt.	relship	compromise
III	little or no direct commun. threats predom.	good vs. evil distrust, lack of respect	basic values	win-lose defensive competition
IV	none except direct attacks on other to hurt	hopeless other nonhuman	survival	no winner destruction minimize losses

Adapted from Glasl (1982)

APPENDIX E

SEQUENCING OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION

INTERVENTION SEQUENCE



Glasl - Choice of initial and subsequent strategies also depends on:

1) number of parties involved
2) flexibility/rigidity of parties
3) time available

APPENDIX E

REFERENCES

Azar, E.E. & J.W. Burton, International Conflict Resolutions: Theory and Practice, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1986.

Azar E.E., "The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict and the Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations," Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1981-1999, 1983.

Beres, M.E. & S.M. Schmidt, "The Conflict Carousel: A Contingency Approach to Conflict Management, G.B.J. Bomers & R.B. Peterson (eds.), Conflict Management and Industrial Relations, Boston, Kluwer-Nijhof Publishing, 1982.

Burton, J.W., Conflicts and Communication, London, MacMillan and Company, 1969.

Burton J.W., Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook, Lanham, University Press of America, 1987.

Deutsch, M., The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973.

Deutsch, M., "The Prevention of World War III: A Psychological Perspective, Political Psychology, Vol. 4, 1983, pp. 3-32.

Fisher, R.J., "Third-Party Consultation as a Medthod of Intergroup Conflict Resolution: A Review of Studies," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, 1983, pp. 301-344.

Fisher, R.J. & L. Keashly, "Distinguishing Third-Party Intervention in Intergroup Conflict: Consultation is not Mediation," Negotiation Journal.

Glasl, F., "The Process of Conflict Escalation and Role of Third Parties," G.B.J. Bomers & R.B. Peterson (eds.), Conflict Management and Industrial Relations, Boston, Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982.

Kelman, H.C. & S.P. Cohen, "Reduction of International Conflict: An Interactional Approach," W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Monterey, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979.

Mitchell, C.R., Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role, New York, Nichols Publishing Company, 1981.

Prein, H., "A Contingency Approach for Conflict Intervention," Group and Organization Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1984, pp. 81-102.

APPENDIX F

MANAGING REGIONAL CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: OUTLINE II

by Chris Brown

Department of Political Science, Carleton University

1. Is There a Security Regime in Southern Africa?

According to Nye (1987), a security regime "incorporates the whole range of principles, norms, rules and procedures which constrain states' behaviour and around which actors' expectations converge within a given issue." For the regime to exist, it must provide an independent causal effect that cannot be explained by rules of prudence derived from the short-run self-interest of states. That is, as Jervis (1982) puts it, if "patterns of international relations can be explained by the distribution of military and economic power among the states, then the concept of regime will not be useful."

There are clearly tacit rules of conflict in Southern Africa, among which are the following: (i) South Africa is not interested in overthrowing the governments of the SADCC states; (ii) the extent of purely military intervention by South Africa is inversely related to South African trade and investment links with individual SADCC states; (iii) the SADCC states can expect tit-for-tat retaliation for any hostile action they or the liberation groups take against South Africa; (iv) "normal" economic relations continue despite the conflict; and (v) there are official contacts between South Africa and the SADCC states, right up to the Ministerial level. In addition, to these tacit rules, there are also some explicit agreements, including Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia and the Nkomati Accord.

Taken together, these tacit and explicit rules constitute a de facto security relationship. They serve to contain the conflict and prevent significant escalation. By the same token, however, they are insufficient to resolve the conflict; instead, they merely serve to perpetuate it.

Using the definition cited above, the de facto security relationship in Southern Africa is not a regime. The present relationship is adequately explained with reference to military and economic power, especially the great asymmetry in power between South Africa and the SADCC states. South Africa established most of the rules and has felt free to break them as circumstances dictate (e.g., its violation in Nkomati).

The SADCC states, for their part, have little independent ability to shape the rules; they can merely accommodate themselves to the rules.

2. Do the conditions exist for the formation of a security regime?

According to Jervis, four conditions must be met for the formation of a security regime: (i) the actors must want to establish it; (ii) the actors must believe that the others want to establish it; (iii) no actor can believe that security is best provided for by expansion; and (iv) the actors must perceive war and the individualistic pursuit of security as costly. To put these points more generally, the actors must accept a legitimate status quo. According to Nye, for this to happen the actors must have a non-ideological orientation to interstate relations.

If these are the conditions for the formation of a security regime, then the prospects for a regime in Southern Africa are very poor. Taking Jervis' conditions in turn: (i) South Africa has no desire to establish a regime, the present situation meets its needs; (ii) neither side believes the other desires to establish a regime; (iii) South Africa believes that its security is best provided for by regional aggression (if not actual expansion), and so far it has been right; (iv) South Africa does not perceive war to be costly, indeed, the direct military and economic costs of destabilization are minimal while the domestic political benefits (among white voters) are substantial. In sum, destabilization "works"; it is a low cost, low risk, high reward unilateral strategy which precludes regime formation.

Considering this issue more generally, the prospects for a regime are bleak because there is no consensus on the definition of a legitimate status quo. There are security rules and procedures, but not security norms and principles. South Africa, in some respects, is what Nye calls a "revolutionary power." That is, its actions in the region are driven by ideological considerations derived from its domestic politics. The ideology is apartheid and, according to this ideology, stable and prosperous majority-rule states in the region are a security threat to South Africa.

3. What actions can be taken by third parties?

Nye discusses the possibilities for "learning" in the formation of a security regime; presumably, third-party actions should be designed to promote such learning. The assumption behind efforts to promote learning, however, has to be that there is a potential legitimate status quo to be learned. In Southern Africa, this is a misguided assumption.

As the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group learned, efforts to promote cooperation are doomed when one of the parties to the dispute is an ideologically-driven revolutionary power.

According to Nye, learning is the third way in which perceptions of national interest may change; the first is through a domestic shift in power. In Southern Africa, third-party efforts should be designed to encourage a domestic shift in power in the revolutionary state in order to create the conditions for a security regime; this is the logic of sanctions. In the interim, third parties can also seek to mitigate the impact of destabilization; this is the logic for economic and political (and military?) support for the SADCC states.

APPENDIX G

MANAGING REGIONAL CONFLICT
REGIMES AND THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION

NOTES ON SOUTH AFRICA

Dan O'Meara
Centre d'information et de documentation
sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe (CIDMAA)

Given the currently prevailing circumstances in Southern Africa, I am deeply skeptical about the applicability of the concept of "regime" to South African policy in the Southern African region. This has deep implications for the range of possible, and effective, actions/interventions by third parties.

The fundamental issue is one of profound imbalances at every level in Southern Africa. Three such imbalances stand out.

The first is that of **prior beliefs.** Without going into the complex ideological structure of Southern Africa, it is clear that the general system of beliefs underlying South Africa regional policy on the one hand, and those of the member states of firstly the Front Line States, and secondly the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), are profoundly contradictory and indeed mutually exclusive.

Under prevailing circumstances, there seems little that can reduce this incompatibility. The two or three miniscule countries in SADCC who occupy something of a middle position in the region (Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho) lack both the vision and the influence to reduce this dissonance. Learning processes which might do so are blocked not only by the rigidity of prior beliefs, but also by other regional imbalances.

The second, and by far the most determinant of these imbalances, is a profound inequality of **power.** Politically, economically and militarily, the Republic of South Africa dominates the entire region to an extent that it has so far been able to resist any attempts to alter both its domestic and regional relations. The costs to the other states of Southern Africa have been little short of catastrophic. While this has also not been without cost to the South African state, South Africa remains able to absorb these costs in the short and medium term.

This leads thirdly to a deep imbalance in the related processes or **perception and learning.** The events in the region and wider international responses since 1975 have reinforced the prevailing perception in Pretoria. Put in Nye's terms, they have promoted "simple learning" processes which then reinforced pre-existing perceptions. Pretoria has used new information to adapt its means "without altering any deeper goals in the means-end chain."[1]

This South African perception holds:

a) that the current South African state confronts a "total onslaugt" in which all international power blocs participate. Thus in Pretoria's view, while there is clearly important space on the margins to play off the different powers against each other, as in Angola, for example, nevertheless both the US and the USSR participate to varying degress in such a total onslaught, and South African policy has to rest finally on asserting its independent claim to be the "regional power" with "legitimate interests," which all states must be forced to accept;

b) that the exercise of all elements of South Africa's disproportionate power in the region is the key to the survival of the current state. Given the regional power imbalance, Pretoria's strategists believe that the ruthless wielding of power is effective, and that no state, or alignment of states in the region finally has the capacity to withstand South African power;

c) this perception is contingent on yet another--that in the last analysis, the prevailing international geopolitical realities rule out effective intervention against South Africa. This is a newer perception that Pretoria has learned particularly over the past five years. It is now widely believed in South Africa that no major Western power will take effective (rather than symbolic) measures to restrain the wielding of the power of the South African state, both domestically and regionally. Thus at worst, the international interventions will be confined on the one hand to those made by Cuba and the Soviet Union in Angola, and on the other the toothless sanctions package imposed by Western countries.

This implies that there are no real limits to the use of South African power in the region. While there are clearly important debates within the complex decision-making processes

---

[1] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," p. 380.

in the South African state, and there are significant political actors who advocate more cautious tactics than others, this fundamental bottom line is shared by the constellation of institutions, interests, factions and actors the present state comprises. It can be seen as the underlying element in both domestic and regional policies. Here it should be emphasized that the direction and conflicts of domestic politics since 1984, and particularly the successful suppression of the 18 month urban black uprising, have also reinforced this perception.

Finally, the developing institutional structure of decision-making in South Africa leads to even more marked rigidity in regional (and domestic policy), and reinforces the tendency to rely exclusively on the exercise of military and economic power. Since 1978 P.W. Botha has re-organized the South African state in such a way as to institutionalize the military and other security apparatuses as by far the most influential elements in both the decision-making and administrative structures of the state.

Conclusions

If the thrust of this analysis is correct, it implies that the possibility of moving towards a "security regime" in which South Africa participates will be contingent on changing these regional imbalances.

It also assumes that this cannot be achieved through "learning cooperation." South Africa's willful and systematic violation of the 1984 Nkomati Accords with Mozambique[2]--under conditions which made it possible for Pretoria to realize some of its longstanding foreign policy objectives[3]--points to a profound inability to learn even under the most propitious circumstances.

---

[2] A "Non Agression and Good Neighbourliness Pact," signed on March 15, 1984. For evidence of Pretoria's ongoing violation of the Accord, see evidence of US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, to "Hearing on Mozambique and United States Policy." Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 24 June 1987, pp. 168-171.

[3] See R. Davies and D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978," Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 11, 2 April 1985, pp. 207.

Put at its most schematic, there are three interacting broad sets of actors which, in different ways, have some capacity to influence these regional power imbalances. These are: the differentiated domestic opposition in South Africa; the broad and changing regional alliances confronting Pretoria; the diffuse "international community." The latter two constitute the terrain of "third parties" most broadly defined.

The success or failure of such third-party interventions obviously depends on the objectives, the forms, the tactics, and the timing of such interventions. In notes such as these I clearly have neither the space nor time to discuss this broad range of potential interventions.

Suffice it to say that such interventions are largely worthless unless they are genuinely are directed towards shifting these imbalances in Southern Africa. And they need to begin with the most important of these--the power imbalance. There are a very wide range of options which could be considered here, both in terms of strengthening South Africa's neighbours, and measures designed to weaken South Africa's ability to use its overwhelming power against these neighbours.

Whether such policies will be pursued of course raises another problematic issues--the political will in countries like Canada to confront and change these political realities in Southern Africa.